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1  | INTRODUC TION
Prior to the implementation of the primary components of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, there were well- documented 
disparities in insurance coverage along multiple dimensions, such as 
age, race, income, family structure, and geography.1,2 The primary 
components of the ACA, including the individual mandate, subsi-
dized Marketplace coverage, and state Medicaid expansions, were 
designed to reduce health insurance coverage disparities by moving 
the U.S. closer to universal coverage.3 The purpose of this paper was 
to examine the extent to which the ACA reduced disparities in cov-
erage after three years (2014- 2016).
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Objective: To estimate the impact of the major components of the ACA (Medicaid 
expansion, subsidized Marketplace plans, and insurance market reforms) on dispari-
ties in insurance coverage after three years.
Data Source: The 2011- 2016 waves of the American Community Survey (ACS), with 
the sample restricted to nonelderly adults.
Design: We estimate a difference- in- difference- in- differences model to separately 
identify the effects of the nationwide and Medicaid expansion portions of the ACA 
using the methodology developed in the recent ACA literature. The differences come 
from time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pre- ACA uninsured rates. 
In order to focus on access disparities, we stratify our sample separately by income, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, age, gender, and geography.
Principal Findings: After three years, the fully implemented ACA eliminated 43% of 
the coverage gap across income groups, with the Medicaid expansion accounting for 
this entire reduction. The ACA also reduced coverage disparities across racial groups 
by 23%, across marital status by 46%, and across age-groups by 36%, with these 
changes being partly attributable to both the Medicaid expansion and nationwide 
components of the law.
Conclusions: The fully implemented ACA has been successful in reducing coverage 
disparities across multiple groups.
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While gains in insurance coverage after the ACA have been 
well documented, few papers in this literature examine how the 
ACA affected coverage disparities. One recent paper estimates 
the first- year impact of the ACA on coverage using difference- in- 
difference- in- differences (DDD) models where the differences 
come from time, state Medicaid expansion decisions, and pre- ACA 
local area uninsured rates.4 This strategy leverages the propensity 
for universal coverage initiatives to provide the most intense “treat-
ment” in local areas with the highest prereform uninsured rates.5,6 
Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS), the authors 
find that the ACA increased coverage by an average of 5.9 percent-
age points in Medicaid expansion states compared to 2.8 percentage 
points in nonexpansion states in 2014.4 In subsample analyses, they 
show that the fully implemented ACA (including the Medicaid ex-
pansion) reduced the coverage disparity between college graduates 
and those with a high school diploma or less by 11.4%, and that be-
tween whites and nonwhites by 14%.4 The paper also finds greater 
gains in coverage for young adults and unmarried individuals, which 
had lower pre- ACA coverage rates than older adults and married in-
dividuals, respectively.4
Another recent paper uses the same research strategy and data 
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), finding 
that the ACA reduced the coverage disparity between those with 
incomes above versus below the median by 38%.7 A third paper uses 
ACS data through 2015 and leverages variation in state Medicaid 
expansion decisions, pre- ACA eligibility requirements, and subsidy 
rates across the income distribution.8 They find that coverage gains 
from the Medicaid expansion and premium subsidies are larger 
among childless adult couples than among single adults or adults 
with children, but the increase from the individual mandate is largest 
among singles.8
Other studies focus only on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, using 
simpler difference- in- differences (DD) models to compare changes 
in insurance coverage over time between Medicaid expansion and 
nonexpansion states. One paper includes 2015 data from the ACS 
and shows that the Medicaid expansion reduced the coverage dis-
parity between 19- to 26- and 56- to 64- year- olds by 15%, while 
the disparity between Hispanics and non- Hispanic whites only fell 
by 4%.9 Another paper, also using data through 2015, finds that 
the Medicaid expansion led to smaller gains among low- income 
Hispanics than other low- income individuals, implying a widened 
disparity.10 Other papers provide evidence that the Medicaid expan-
sion increased insurance coverage among those with low incomes or 
levels of education, implying reduced disparities relative to individ-
uals with higher socioeconomic status.11,12 One study’s focus is on 
the impact of the ACA in a single state, Kentucky, finding that much 
of the reduction in the state’s uninsured rate is due to large coverage 
gains from areas with higher concentrations of poverty.13
We contribute to this literature by using the DDD method de-
scribed above and elsewhere4,7,14 to uncover the causal impact 
of the 2014 ACA provisions, both with and without the Medicaid 
expansion, on coverage disparities after three years. Changes in 
coverage disparities are evaluated by stratifying our sample by 
income, race/ethnicity, marital status, age, gender, and geogra-
phy. Data come from the American Community Survey (ACS) be-
tween 2011 and 2016. The ACS includes multiple categories of 
insurance coverage, allowing us to evaluate how the ACA affected 
coverage disparities via changes to both private and public cov-
erage. In addition, the ACS is a large enough survey to precisely 
estimate the effects for states and many local areas, given that it 
includes approximately 3 000 000 observations per year and rel-
atively narrow geographic identifiers. Finally, the mandatory na-
ture of the ACS reduces concerns about sample selection among 
respondents.
Our primary hypothesis is that, in its first three years, the ACA sig-
nificantly reduced insurance coverage disparities across demographic 
groups. We contribute to the literature on the ACA’s coverage effects 
in multiple ways. First, we are, to our knowledge, the first to quan-
tify the impacts of the ACA on disparities using three years of post- 
ACA implementation data (2014- 2016). One recent study examines 
the effect on the uninsured rate after three years using the BRFSS, 
but does not specifically examine disparities.14 Second, in contrast 
to the BRFSS, the ACS allows us to examine how changes in sources 
of coverage, such as employer- sponsored and individually purchased 
private coverage and Medicaid, drove any changes in disparities. 
Third, in contrast to other recent work,9,10 our approach allows us to 
estimate the impact of the fully implemented ACA, rather than just 
focusing on the Medicaid expansion. Fourth, we examine disparities 
along a new dimension: residence in rural vs. urban locations.
2  | DATA
The ACS is a nationally representative survey administered by the 
Census Bureau sampling approximately 1% of the U.S. population an-
nually. Participation is mandatory, and the survey can be completed 
online or through the mail. In terms of geography, the ACS identifies 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia, and additionally identifies 
localities known as Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). PUMAs are 
approximately 2300 areas of at least 100 000 people nested entirely 
within a state. Our primary sample consists of 19- to 64- year- olds 
from calendar years 2011 to 2016, which results in over 3 000 000 
individuals per year. By starting our sample period in 2011, we aim, 
as in other recent work,4 to measure only the effects of the package 
of ACA provisions taking effect in 2014, as opposed to also capturing 
the effect of the 2010 dependent coverage mandate that required 
insurers to allow dependents to remain on their parents’ insurance 
plans until the plan year following their 26th birthday. This mandate 
has already been studied extensively in prior research.15-19
We create several binary outcome variables based on the ACS 
insurance coverage questions: any insurance, any private insur-
ance (either employer sponsored or directly purchased), employer- 
sponsored insurance, directly purchased insurance, Medicaid, and 
any other coverage. We define other coverage as neither private nor 
Medicaid coverage. These categories are not mutually exclusive due 
to the possibility of multiple sources of coverage.
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In order to exploit within- state variation in pre- ACA uninsured 
rates in 2013 to identify the impact of the national components 
of the ACA, we would ideally simply use the PUMA classification 
system included in the ACS. Unfortunately, the PUMA definitions 
changed during our sample period due to new boundaries intro-
duced in the 2010 Census. To address this problem, we follow a 
recent paper4 and use both the old and new PUMA classification 
systems to identify core- based statistical areas (CBSAs), which we 
then use as our local areas. If a CBSA spans multiple states, we de-
fine a different local area for the parts of the CBSA in each state. In 
addition, we create additional local areas for the non- CBSA portion 
of each state, in order to prevent respondents who do not live in a 
CBSA from being dropped from the sample. We classify non- CBSA 
local areas as “rural” and CBSA local areas as “urban.” Our dataset 
consists of 630 local areas that each contain between 356 and 
78 781 ACS respondents in 2013, with a median of 1020 and a mean 
of 2811 respondents. This implies that our pre- ACA uninsured rates 
are computed from a reasonably large sample in each local area.
By 2016, a total of 32 states expanded their Medicaid program 
via the ACA.20 The majority of these states, 25 in all, expanded 
Medicaid in January 2014. Michigan (April) and New Hampshire 
(August) expanded later in 2014. Pennsylvania (January), Indiana 
(February), and Alaska (September) expanded Medicaid during 2015. 
Finally, Montana (January) and Louisiana (July) expanded Medicaid 
during 2016. We assign the starting date of these states’ Medicaid 
expansions in our expansion indicator accordingly.
Our “demographic” controls include dummies for age (25- 29, 30- 
34, 35- 39, 40- 44, 45- 49, 50- 54, 55- 59, and 60- 64, with 19- 24 being 
the omitted base category), female, race/ethnicity (non- Hispanic 
black, Hispanic, and other race/ethnicity, with non- Hispanic white 
being the omitted category), foreign- born, and U.S. citizenship sta-
tus. Our “family structure” controls include dummies for married and 
the number of children 18 and under in the household (one, two, 
three, four, and five or more, with zero being the omitted category). 
Our “economic” controls consist of dummies for education (high 
school degree, some college, and college graduate, with less than 
a high school degree as the omitted category), household income 
(dummies for each 10- point increment of income as a percentage of 
the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), with the highest category including 
everyone over 500%), whether the respondent reports her primary 
occupation as student, and whether the respondent is unemployed, 
as well as one continuous variable: the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
annual state unemployment rate. Finally, we include interactions 
of the post- treatment dummy with indicators of whether states 
set up their own private insurance exchanges (as opposed to using 
the federal exchange) and whether these exchanges experienced 
glitches.20,21 These variables serve as proxies for harder- to- measure 
aspects of state involvement with the ACA, such as the degree of 
state outreach.
Table 1 provides pretreatment means and standard deviations of 
the dependent variables of interest measuring insurance coverage, 
while Table S1 does the same for the controls. We also stratify into four 
groups based on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid TA
B
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and whether her local area’s pretreatment uninsured rate was above or 
below the median for individuals in the sample. Table 1 shows that 79% 
of the sample was covered by some type of insurance in the baseline year 
of 2013, including 11% with Medicaid and 60% with employer- provided 
coverage. For both the high- and low- uninsured rate subgroups, individ-
uals in Medicaid expansion states were slightly more likely to be cov-
ered by some type of insurance in 2013 than those in nonexpansion 
states, with the differences being driven entirely by Medicaid coverage. 
Our DDD model will account for such baseline differences.
Figure 1 presents changes in our coverage measures between 
2011 and 2016, stratified into the same four groups. With six in-
surance outcomes and four groups per outcome, there are a total 
of 24 lines. In general, the pre- ACA trends do not appear to differ 
meaningfully by state Medicaid expansion status or local area pre- 
ACA uninsured rate. This provides preliminary support for the use 
of the pre- ACA uninsured rate and Medicaid expansion variables as 
sources of identification in our DDD model. Figure 1 shows that the 
probabilities of having any coverage, privately purchased coverage, 
any private coverage, and Medicaid increased in 2014 and continued 
to grow over the following two years.
3  | METHODS
In order to uncover the causal impact of the ACA on coverage dis-
parities after three years, we follow the recent ACA literature by es-
timating DDD models with the differences coming from time, state 
Medicaid expansion decisions, and pre- ACA local area uninsured 
rates.4,7,14 Our baseline DDD regression equation is given by equa-
tion (1) below. In order to examine coverage disparities, we estimate 
this model separately for different subsamples, such as separately 
for males and females.
where yiast is an indicator of insurance coverage for individual i in 
local area a in state s in year t, POSTt is an indicator for whether 
period t is in the postreform period of 2014 or later, Xiast is a vec-
tor of control variables previously described, MEDICAIDs is an 
indicator for whether state s participated in the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion, UNINSUREDas is the 2013 (pre- ACA) uninsured rate 
in local area a within state s, t denotes year fixed effects, as de-
notes local area fixed effects, and iast is a standard error term.
The term POSTt is not separately included in Equation (1) 
since it is absorbed by the time fixed effects, while the terms 
UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDst are not separately included since they 
are absorbed by the local area fixed effects.
The effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion is 
given by γ1 × UNINSUREDas, which means it is assumed to be 
zero in a (hypothetical) area with a 0% uninsured rate at base-
line and to increase linearly as the pre- ACA uninsured rate rises.4 
Similarly, the effect of the Medicaid expansion alone is given by 
3×UNINSUREDas×MEDICAIDst, meaning it is zero in nonexpansion 
states (where MEDICAIDst=0) and 3×UNINSUREDas in expansion 
states (where MEDICAIDst=1). We consider 2 to represent unob-
served confounders rather than capturing part of the expansion’s 
(1)
yiast=0+1(UNINSUREDas×POSTt)+2(MEDICAIDS×POSTt)+
3(UNINSUREDas×MEDICAIDS×POSTt)+4Xiast+t+as+iast
F IGURE  1 Changes in insurance coverage over time
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causal effect, since the Medicaid expansion should not causally 
affect coverage in an area with a 0% baseline uninsured rate. The 
effect of the “fully implemented” ACA, that is, in Medicaid ex-
pansion states, combines the impacts of the Medicaid and non- 
Medicaid components: 1×UNINSUREDas+3×UNINSUREDas. In 
our results, we report the predicted effect of the ACA at the sam-
ple mean pretreatment uninsured rate. Formally, this predicted 
effect is given by 1×UNINSUREDas  in nonexpansion states and 
1×UNINSUREDas+3×UNINSUREDas  in expansion states. For each 
subsample of interest, we re compute the pre treatment uninsured 
rate using only individuals within that particular subsample.4
4  | RESULTS
Tables 2-4 report the implied effects of the ACA at the average pre- 
ACA uninsured rate based on coefficient estimates from the DDD 
regression described by equation (1) for each coverage outcome. 
TABLE  2  Implied effects of the ACA at mean pre treatment uninsured rate for full sample and income and race subsamples
Any insurance Any private Employer- sponsored Individually purchased Medicaid Other
Panel I: Full sample
Non elderly adults aged 19- 64 (pre treatment uninsured rate = 0.203, sample size = 10 537 667)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.050*** (0.011) −0.009	(0.009) 0.003 (0.007) −0.010	(0.012) 0.062*** (0.008) 0.001 (0.001)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.087*** (0.005) 0.028*** (0.006) 0.017*** (0.004) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.062*** (0.007) 0.001 (0.001)
Panel II: Income subsamples
Under 138% FPL (Pre treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.395, sample size = 1 949 375)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.170*** (0.033) −0.031	(0.018) −0.007	(0.016) −0.024	(0.019) 0.216*** (0.036) −0.003	(0.003)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.169*** (0.029) 0.018 (0.011) 0.015 (0.009) 0.002 (0.007) 0.154*** (0.031) 0.002 (0.002)
138%- 400% FPL (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.237, sample size = 4 137 149)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.056*** (0.016) 0.011 (0.015) 0.023 (0.016) −0.008	(0.016) 0.047** (0.015) 0.001 (0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.105*** (0.013) 0.066*** (0.014) 0.050*** (0.011) 0.019*** (0.006) 0.042** (0.013) −0.001	(0.001)
Over 400% FPL (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.067, sample size = 4 482 022)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.012** (0.004) 0.002 (0.006) 0.006 (0.009) −0.002	(0.007) 0.010* (0.004) −0.001	(0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.028*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.010* (0.004) 0.001 (0.002)
Panel III: Race/Ethnicity subsamples
Non- Hispanic white (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.144, sample size = 7 149 482)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.051*** (0.006) −0.002	(0.006) 0.004 (0.008) −0.004	(0.007) 0.058*** (0.008) −0.002	(0.001)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.077*** (0.005) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.010** (0.004) 0.007* (0.003) 0.067*** (0.007) −0.003*** (0.001)
Non- white (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.306, sample size = 3 388 185)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.070*** (0.020) −0.014	(0.019) 0.005 (0.009) −0.015	(0.020) 0.083*** (0.013) 0.006* (0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.115*** (0.009) 0.039*** (0.009) 0.025** (0.008) 0.018** (0.006) 0.075*** (0.012) 0.004* (0.002)
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated at the mean pretreatment unin-
sured rate. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity- robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level, ** 
at 1% level, and * at 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.
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The top panel of Table 2 gives the implied effects that come from 
our full non elderly adult sample, while the subsequent panels strat-
ify the sample in different ways. The first row in each panel shows 
the pre- ACA uninsured rate, which we use to calculate the pre- ACA 
disparities in coverage. Indicators of statistical significance are given 
at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. For each regression, we separately 
report: (a) the implied effects of the Medicaid expansion alone, and 
(b) the fully implemented ACA, which includes the Medicaid ex-
pansion as well as the individual mandate, subsidized Marketplace 
coverage, etc. This allows for easier comparison to previous work 
that focused on the Medicaid expansion and not the national com-
ponents of the ACA.
The first column of the top panel of Table 2 suggests that at the 
average pre- ACA uninsured rate, the Medicaid expansion increased 
the proportion of residents with insurance coverage by 5 percentage 
points over the three- year period of 2014- 2016. In comparison, the 
fully implemented ACA led to an 8.7 percentage point increase in 
coverage, implying that the package of nationwide reforms contrib-
uted the remaining 3.7 percentage points. The remaining columns 
examine sources of coverage, where we consider any source of 
TABLE  3  Implied effects of the ACA at mean pretreatment uninsured rate for marital status and age subsamples
Any insurance Any private Employer- sponsored Individually purchased Medicaid Other
Panel I: Marital status subsamples
Married (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.141, sample size = 5 978 285)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.032*** (0.008) −0.005	(0.006) 0.0010 (0.004) −0.006	(0.008) 0.038*** (0.005) 0.001 (0.001)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.060*** (0.003) 0.022*** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.040*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001)
Unmarried (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.272, sample size = 4 559 382)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.080*** (0.013) −0.010	(0.013) 0.005 (0.011) −0.012	(0.015) 0.093*** (0.013) 0.001 (0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.120*** (0.009) 0.035*** (0.009) 0.025*** (0.006) 0.011* (0.004) 0.089*** (0.011) 0.001 (0.001)
Panel II: Age subsamples
Ages 19- 26 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.270, sample size = 1 562 121)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.077*** (0.015) −0.008	(0.014) 0.006 (0.011) −0.011	(0.012) 0.090*** (0.013) 0.001 (0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.124*** (0.009) 0.031** (0.009) 0.024** (0.008) 0.009* (0.004) 0.097*** (0.012) 0.003* (0.001)
Ages 27- 34 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.256, sample size = 1 667 573)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.054*** (0.012) −0.012	(0.011) 0.006 (0.008) −0.004	(0.009) 0.070*** (0.013) 0.001 (0.003)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.093*** (0.009) 0.020* (0.008) 0.010 (0.006) 0.010* (0.004) 0.076*** (0.009) 0.002 (0.003)
Ages 35- 49 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.201, sample size = 3 330 941)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.035*** (0.010) −0.012	(0.009) −0.002	(0.006) −0.008	(0.010) 0.046*** (0.008) 0.002 (0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.073*** (0.005) 0.026*** (0.005) 0.017*** (0.004) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.048*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.001)
Ages 50- 64 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.145, sample size = 3 977 032)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.036*** (0.007) −0.005	(0.005) 0.008 (0.008) −0.010	(0.012) 0.044*** (0.005) −0.002	(0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.070*** (0.004) 0.030*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.003) 0.044*** (0.003) −0.002	(0.002)
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated at the mean pretreatment unin-
sured rate. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity- robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level, ** 
at 1% level, and * at 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.
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private coverage, any employer- sponsored (ESI) plan, any individu-
ally purchased plan, Medicaid, and any other coverage source. Our 
results suggest that in an area with the mean pre- ACA uninsured 
rate, the fully implemented ACA is predicted to increase private cov-
erage by 2.8 percentage points. This is driven by increases in both 
ESI (1.7 percentage points) and individually purchased coverage (1.2 
percentage points). The full ACA increased Medicaid coverage by 
6.2%, all of which comes from the Medicaid expansion component of 
the law. The effects of the Medicaid expansion on having any private 
coverage, ESI, and individually purchased insurance reported are all 
statistically insignificant.
The other two panels of Table 2 stratify the sample into sub-
samples separately by income and race. Since each subsample 
must contain enough 2013 respondents to accurately compute 
uninsured rates at the local area level, we are constrained to a 
maximum of two or three subsamples per stratification in order 
to obtain meaningfully precise estimates. For income, we consider 
three groups: those with income under 138% of the FPL, those 
between 138% and 400%, and those above 400%. The lowest 
income group was made eligible for Medicaid in states that ex-
panded their Medicaid programs via the ACA. Additionally, those 
between 100% and 138% of the FPL were eligible for subsidized 
Marketplace coverage with sliding scale premiums in states that 
did not expand Medicaid. The middle- income group was made el-
igible for subsidized Marketplace coverage with sliding scale pre-
miums in all states. The highest income group was also able to 
purchase Marketplace coverage in all states, but was not eligible 
for a subsidy. In 2013, the uninsured rate for those in the highest 
income group was 6.7%, while it was 39.5% for the lowest income 
group.
According to the first column of Table 2, this 32.8 percentage 
point coverage gap was reduced by 15.8 percentage points (= 17 
percentage point reduction for the lowest income group—1.2 per-
centage point reduction for the highest income group) by the 
Medicaid expansion. This represents a 48% reduction in the low- 
income coverage gap. The fully implemented ACA, which includes 
the Medicaid expansion, but also influences the coverage of higher 
income individuals through the national components of the ACA, re-
duced the low- income coverage gap by 43%.
Turning to sources of coverage in the remaining columns, sev-
eral results emerge. First, the gain in coverage among low- income 
individuals occurred completely via Medicaid coverage in Medicaid 
TABLE  4  Implied effects of the ACA at mean pretreatment uninsured rate for gender and rural/urban subsamples
Any insurance Any private Employer- sponsored Individually purchased Medicaid Other
Panel I: Gender subsamples
Women (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.186, sample size = 5 473 836)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.064*** (0.011) −0.006	(0.009) 0.007 (0.010) −0.011	(0.010) 0.071*** (0.013) 0.002 (0.001)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.096*** (0.008) 0.030*** (0.007) 0.023*** (0.006) 0.008* (0.004) 0.067*** (0.011) 0.002 (0.001)
Men (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.223, sample size = 5 094 710)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.057*** (0.011) −0.003	(0.010) 0.010 (0.011) −0.008	(0.015) 0.067*** (0.012) −0.003	(0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.097*** (0.008) 0.040*** (0.010) 0.028*** (0.005) 0.017*** (0.015) 0.063*** (0.010) −0.001	(0.002)
Panel II: Rural vs urban subsamples
Rural (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.212, sample size = 1 964 610)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.081*** (0.016) −0.015	(0.013) −0.012	(0.008) −0.004	(0.012) 0.098*** (0.020) 0.001 (0.004)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.120*** (0.014) 0.018 (0.011) 0.014** (0.005) −0.004	(0.010) 0.110*** (0.017) −0.004	(0.003)
Urban (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.203, sample size = 8 603 936)
Medicaid 
expansion
0.056*** (0.011) −0.004	(0.009) 0.011 (0.011) −0.010	(0.013) 0.064*** (0.011) −0.001	(0.002)
Full ACA 
(w/
Medicaid)
0.091*** (0.008) 0.036*** (0.008) 0.026*** (0.006) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.058*** (0.010) 0.001 (0.001)
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated at the mean pretreatment unin-
sured rate. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity- robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level, ** 
at 1% level, and * at 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.
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expansion states. Moreover, some of the coverage expansion among 
middle- and high- income individuals occurred via Medicaid cov-
erage even though these income ranges were not eligible for the 
expansion.
We next examine the race stratification in the third panel of 
Table 2. The racial coverage gap in 2013 was 16.2 percentage 
points, with nonwhites having an uninsured rate of 30.6%, as com-
pared to 14.4% for non- Hispanic whites. Our results suggest that 
the Medicaid expansion reduced the 16.2 percentage point cover-
age gap by 1.9 percentage points (12%), while the fully implemented 
ACA reduced the gap by 3.8 percentage points (23%). The results for 
source of coverage show that the larger gains for nonwhites occur 
across the board, as the effects of the full ACA on all types of cover-
age are larger for them than for whites.
The top panel of Table 3 examines disparities of coverage by 
marital status. In 2013, unmarried individuals had a 27.2% uninsured 
rate, while married individuals had a 14.1% uninsured rate. This un-
married coverage gap was reduced by 4.8 percentage points (37 %) 
by the Medicaid expansion, while the fully implemented ACA re-
duced this coverage gap by 6 percentage points (46%). The shrinking 
gap is attributable to larger gains in employer- provided and Medicaid 
coverage among unmarried individuals.
The bottom panel of Table 3 splits the sample into four age-
groups: 19- 26 years of age, 27- 34 years of age, 35- 49 years of 
age, and 50- 64 years of age. The rationale for separating 19- to 
26- year- olds from 27- to 34- year- olds is that the former was pre-
viously affected by the earliest major ACA coverage expansion to 
take effect, the 2010 dependent coverage mandate. Depending 
on the mandate’s effectiveness, it is possible that the effect of the 
2014 ACA provisions that we study could be weaker among 19- to 
26- than 27- to 34- year- olds. That said, the results show that those 
aged 19- 26 years still had the highest uninsured rate (27.0%) among 
the age-groups in 2013, three years after the dependent coverage 
mandate took effect. Those aged 50- 64 had the lowest uninsured 
rate of 14.5%, for a young adult coverage gap of 12.5 percentage 
points. The Medicaid expansion reduced this coverage gap by 4.1 
percentage points (33%), and all 2014 ACA provisions together 
reduced it by 5.4 percentage points (43%). The larger gain among 
19- to 26- year- olds is driven by a much larger increase in Medicaid 
coverage (9.7 percentage points for the full ACA compared to 4.4 
percentage points among 50- to 64- year- olds).
The top panel of Table 4 stratifies sample by gender. We did not 
observe as large an initial coverage gap by gender (22.3% uninsured 
rate for males vs. 18.6% for females). The results suggest that the 
Medicaid expansion actually increased the size of this coverage gap 
by 19% since it reduced the uninsured rate for females by a greater 
degree than it did for males. Conversely, the fully implemented ACA 
reduced the size of the gender coverage gap by 3%.
The bottom panel of Table 4 stratifies our sample by urban vs. 
rural location. Rural individuals are generally considered a vulnera-
ble population when it comes to health care access. The uninsured 
rate in 2013 was 21.2% for rural nonelderly adults as compared to 
20.3% for urban nonelderly adults, so the initial disparity in terms 
of insurance coverage was about 1 percentage point. The fully im-
plemented ACA reduced this disparity by 2.9 percentage points, 2.5 
percentage points of which comes from the Medicaid expansion.
Tables 2-4 only report impacts of the ACA at the relevant mean 
pretreatment uninsured rate, which is 20.3% for the full sample and 
varies for each subsample of interest. This approach masks consider-
able heterogeneity in the law’s effects since local area pretreatment 
uninsured rates varied widely, ranging from 3% to 53% with a stan-
dard deviation of 7% for the full sample. Figure S1 therefore shows 
how the predicted changes in coverage vary across this range of un-
insured rates in both expansion states (as indicated by “Full ACA”) 
and nonexpansion states (as indicated by “ACA Without Medicaid 
Expansion”). The top left graph shows that the predicted impact of 
the full ACA on the probability of having any coverage reached as 
high as 22.6 percentage points at the highest sample pre treatment 
uninsured rate (53%). In contrast, without the Medicaid expansion 
the maximum effect was only 9.5 percentage points. The “Medicaid 
coverage” graph predicts increases in Medicaid coverage that reach 
as high as 16.1 and 0.1 percentage points in expansion and nonex-
pansion states, respectively.
Similarly, Tables S2-S4 display the impact of the Medicaid expan-
sion and the fully implemented ACA for the mean of the lower and 
higher portion of the uninsured rates for all subsamples. These re-
sults suggest that for practically every type of coverage, the larger 
the proportion of the subsample uninsured in 2013, the larger the 
gain in coverage. For example, among individuals with income below 
138% of the FPL, the mean pre treatment uninsured rate for the 
upper half of their uninsured rate distribution is 46.3% and the mean 
for the lower half of the distribution is 33%. Table S2 reports that the 
fully implemented ACA is predicted to increase coverage by 20 per-
centage points at the mean of the upper half of the uninsured rate 
distribution of this group, while predicted to increase coverage by 14 
percentage points at the mean of the lower half of the distribution.
5  | DISCUSSION
The primary components of the ACA were designed to reduce in-
surance coverage disparities by moving the U.S. closer to universal 
coverage. This paper is the first to use three years of post- ACA im-
plementation data (2014- 2016) to estimate the impact of the law 
on disparities across different categories of coverage along several 
dimensions, including income, race, marital status, age, gender, and 
residence in rural vs. urban locations. We find that the ACA reduced 
the coverage disparity by income by 43% and that this was entirely 
driven by the Medicaid expansion that was specifically targeted 
at low- income childless adults. Conversely, we find that both the 
Medicaid expansion and nationwide provisions of the ACA con-
tributed to the 23%, 46%, and 36% reductions in coverage dispari-
ties by race, marital status, and age, respectively. The ACA did not 
meaningfully influence the coverage gap by gender, while it closed 
and actually reversed the small rural coverage gap. Ultimately, we 
conclude that the ACA substantially reduced coverage disparities 
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along several important dimensions, but that sizeable disparities still 
remain across income, race, marital status, and age-groups.
The fact that the ACA’s impacts on disparities cannot be fully 
attributed to the Medicaid expansion along most dimensions illus-
trates the importance of implementing econometric techniques that 
capture other aspects of the law. The DDD models we report on 
this paper are causally interpretable based on the identifying as-
sumptions that, conditional on the controls, if the ACA had not oc-
curred: (a) changes in coverage in the postreform period would not 
have been correlated with prereform uninsured rates, and (b) any 
differential changes in coverage in the post reform period between 
expansion and nonexpansion states would not have been correlated 
with prereform uninsured rates.
One limitation of our work is that we cannot test these identi-
fying assumptions directly. However, we can test them indirectly 
with an event study model that interacts the treatment variables 
with the full set of year fixed effects. This allows us to trace out the 
effects of the treatment variables over time, relative to a base year 
of 2013. We would expect around 5% of the coefficient estimates 
of interest in the pre treatment years 2011 and 2012 to be statis-
tically significant at the 5% level merely by chance. Substantially 
more significant findings for these “placebo tests” could indicate 
a problem with the identifying assumption. In Tables S5-S7, we 
present the results from the event study models for the full sample 
and all subsamples. Across the three tables, the interactions of the 
treatment variables with 2011 and 2012 are significant 14% of the 
time (55 out of 384), which is somewhat greater than the expected 
5%. However, for many subsamples the model performs quite 
well. Nearly half of the placebo test failures (23 out of the 55) are 
concentrated among the coefficients on UNINSUREDas×POSTt for 
the age subsamples. Our main results for the effects of the non- 
Medicaid expansion components of the ACA among the age sub-
samples should therefore be interpreted with the most caution.
Another limitation is that our disparity analyses assume that the 
subsamples are exogenously determined. Income is one source of 
stratification that might seem particularly likely to adjust endoge-
nously in response to the 2014 ACA provisions. Two recent papers 
found little impact of the ACA Medicaid expansions on work effort, 
implying that the effect on income should be minimal.11,22 Another 
found that while labor market outcomes in the aggregate were not 
significantly affected by the ACA, labor force participation reduc-
tions in areas with higher potential exchange enrollment were offset 
by increases in labor force participation in areas with higher poten-
tial Medicaid enrollment.23 In order to examine whether our par-
ticular ACA treatment variables influence income, the first column 
of Table S8 presents the results of our baseline regression model 
estimated with household income (measured relative to the poverty 
line) as the dependent variable. The results suggest that there was 
no statistically significant effect of the Medicaid expansion or the 
fully implemented ACA on individual income.
Similarly, it is also possible that the 2014 ACA provisions had 
some impact on marital decisions. A recent doctoral dissertation 
found that the Massachusetts coverage expansion of 2006—which 
featured a combination of insurance market regulations, individual 
and employer mandates, subsidies, and health insurance exchanges 
that served as the model for the ACA—had only small effects on 
marriage and divorce rates.24 In Table S8, we estimate our baseline 
regression model separately with indicators of being married, of 
being newly married during the past 12 months, of being newly 
divorced during the past 12 months, and of being newly married or 
divorced in the past 12 months as dependent variables. The results 
suggest that there was no statistically significant effect of our ACA 
treatment variables on these outcomes. In addition, we replicate 
our main analyses after dropping individuals from the sample that 
had any change in their marital status in the last 12 months. The 
results, reported in Table S9, are very similar to the results pre-
sented previously. While the available evidence therefore suggests 
that our assumption of exogenous stratification is plausible, it is of 
course not possible to establish this definitively.
With those limitations in mind, our results are broadly con-
sistent with those reported in the Medicaid expansion literature9 
in that both the Medicaid expansion and the fully implemented 
ACA generally reduce but do not eliminate coverage disparities. 
These results imply that full repeal of the ACA would exacerbate 
these disparities. Additionally, it is possible that changes to the 
ACA after 2016, including regulatory changes, such as Medicaid 
work requirements, and the elimination of the individual mandate, 
would lead to further changes in disparities. For example, our find-
ing that the Medicaid expansion eliminated 43% of the coverage 
gap across income groups is likely to change if Medicaid work re-
quirements, that would be expected to potentially reduce enroll-
ment,25 are widely implemented. Thus, more work is needed to 
examine the impact of the ACA as economic conditions change 
and the ACA itself changes.
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